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Rights, Rhetoric and Reality:
A New Look at Old Theory
ALBERT BRODERICK, O.P.*
Do convicted prisoners have a "right of rehabilitation?"' I raise this ques-
tion for discussion, not so much to contend that they do, or they do not, but
as a vehicle for arguing a broader proposition: If we would substitute reality
for rhetoric, we would consider "rights" as "social" rather than merely "indi-
vidual." Our whole focus of discussing "rights" is distorted-and I am
speaking of "legal rights," and more particularly new "rights" that have not
previously received legal recognition.
We recall that we are a constitutional people, that our Federal Bill of Rights
was adopted as a restriction upon governmental activity, a limit upon the
power of legislative and executive action. We point out that John Locke had
laid the foundation with the notion that when men entered society they with-
* Professor of Law, Catholic University of America School of Law; A.B., Princeton,
1937; LL.B., Harvard, 1941; S.J.D., Harvard, 1963; D. Phil., Oxford, 1968; Member of
New York and District of Columbia bars.
1. A report issued in November 1969 by the New York State Senate Committee
on Penal Institutions, Senator John R. Dunne, Chairman, assailed the New York City
and upstate county jails as "more fertile breeding grounds for crime than the streets."
The report, made after a nine month inquiry, decried "the inequities of the [prison]
system which demean our community and threaten its future safety," and charged that
"intense overcrowding, inadequate personnel and poorly designed facilities have re-
sulted in turning detention facilities into settings less humane than our public zoos."
The report proposed that imprisonment should be "viewed as the midpoint in a con-
tinuum which emphasizes the need to rehabilitate the jailed criminal." Further delay
by the state in taking remedial measures, it said, would "deny the public the protection
it needs by releasing angrier, more frustrated and alienated human beings." N.Y.
Times, Nov. 10, 1969, at 30, cols. 1, 3.
On the same day that the Dunne Report was issued, the Joint Commission on
Correctional Manpower and Training, authorized by Congress in 1965, called for ade-
quate appropriations for sweeping reforms in the prison systems to "reduce the incidence
of crime and delinquency by restoring thousands of persons each year to productive
lives" by "bring[ing] about a more effective correctional system in this country." Id.
at 1, col. 1.
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held certain "natural rights" for themselves as individuals, which the state
may not infringe. 2  True, some opponents of the Bill of Rights contended it
was unnecessary, that all its specific limitations were understood in the docu-
ment written in Philadelphia as it stood. But those who wanted them
written down prevailed. And the "individualistic" diction has persisted in the
2. As Mr. Justice Jackson put it: "The whole constitutional philosophy of the
time was based on a system of values in which the highest was the freedom of the
individual from interference by officialdom-the rights of man." R. JACKSON, THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 3 (1955).
The historical antecedents of the individualist "natural rights" doctrine in American
law are hardly disputed. The English writer who first put the focus on "right" as
being totally individual, and not social, was Thomas Hobbes. His hypothetical "social
contract," however, left no recourse in law for the individual against the sovereign.
John Locke, also using "social contract" terminology, accented "inalienable rights" of
the individual (with a special emphasis on property) which the government was
morally held to respect. However, Locke left the individual no legal recourse for
violation, merely the extralegal recourse of revolution. It was Locke whose ideas
chiefly inspired the American revolutionary and constitutional documents, although
Jean Jacques Rousseau was not without influence. The "natural rights" doctrine in
the 19th century American law had its chief impact in the "vested rights" doctrine
concerning property.
The definitive philosophical study of the origins and implications of individualist
"natural rights" doctrines has not yet been written. It will require attention to the
fact that in Western thought until the 14th century (Greek, Roman and medieval
Christian thought) the notion of ius was of something objective (justice). William of
Occam, denying the reality of anything but individuals, first shifted the emphasis upon
ius from objective social considerations (which included what was naturally due to
individuals) to the unitary view that ius (now "right") was the faculty of an individual.
The impact of this doctrine was not widely felt until Hobbes. Hobbes, following
Occam, wrote that the individual on entering organized society brought with him as
"civil rights" those rights the sovereign by the "social contract" agreed to enforce-
but with no recourse against it if it did not. Locke would give the subject moral,
but no legal recourse. Under our constitutional law, "the people" adopted the basic
rules they chose to live under, including limitations upon governmental action. The
Supreme Court under the doctrine of judicial review enunciated in Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (I Cranch.) 137 (1803), construes these social rules of limitations, even
against other governmental authorities.
The thesis here is that just as the Constitution (including the Bill of Rights) is a
social document, so are the continuing "interpretations" of the document by the Court
-and by Congress and the Executive as well. This is particularly applicable to its
interpretations of the "vague" clauses of the Constitution, such as "due process" and
"equal protection." The thesis does not say that the Court has the social function or
"right" to "amend" the Constitution, since the power of amendment is allocated else-
where. Much of the emotional discussion concerning the Court concerns differing
views as to what constitutes amendment, and what constitutes merely "interpretation."
But this has nothing to do with the thesis here-that law, including constitutional law,
is essentially social.
One society (such as our own) may more highly value individual interests (say
"moral rights," if you like) than another. This "individual rights" problem continues
also to beset European juridical thought. In France, for example, the droit (right) is
chiefly conceived as "droit subjectif," the right of the individual. For a brilliant recent
historical treatment urging a return to objective, realist, social focus upon "right," see
M. VILLEY, Droit Subjectif, in SEIZE ESSAIS DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 140 (1969).
See Delos, The Theory of the Institution, in THE FRENCH INSTITUTIONALISTS (Broderick
ed., Welling transl. 1970). But see P. ROUBIER, DROITS SUBJECTIFS ET SITUATIONS
JURIDIQUES (1963); J. DABIN, LE DROIT SUBJECTIF (1952).
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courts which interpret such clauses as "due process," "establishment of
religion," "freedom of speech, or of the press," "unreasonable searches and
seizures" and "just compensation." In a traditional passage in one of his
most controversial opinions, Chief Justice Warren recalled that "the Con-
stitution has prescribed the rights of the individual when confronted with the
power of government . . . . 3 And these the state cannot infringe.
This emphasis upon such "rights," as rooted, property-like, in individuals,
mistakes the procedural function of the individual. Put bluntly, my sug-
gestion is that every legal right is a social right. The individual is simply a
subject bearing that claim before a court for its consideration in a "case or
controversy." If the court agrees with him, the individual will be rewarded
by winning his case and its fruits. And, other individuals of which he is a
type will likewise benefit from the socio-legal rule laid down. This novel
assertion will take a lot of convincing, so firmly lodged is the prevailing indi-
vidualistic formulation. My aim is to etch out a few reasons for considering
the proposition.
There is a surprising tendency, even with those who should be embar-
rassed to be so obvious, to define a "right" as a "legally protected interest."
The interesting question is this: What criteria does a legislature, or a court,
use in identifying a new interest that is henceforth to obtain that legal pro-
tection? This question arises in our legal system most dramatically, but not
exclusively, when a court decides whether an individual plaintiff asserting a
"right" shall have his way against the claim of the other side (often a gov-
ernmental unit) that he is mistaken. Mr. Gideon asserts he has a "right to
counsel" of enlarged dimensions; the State of Florida says that he does not.4
Miss Mapp asserts that she has a right not to have evidence used against her
which was obtained by police who invaded her home without the magic war-
rant; the State of Ohio says that she does not. 5 Mr. Miranda says that he
has a right not to be convicted with the help of confessions obtained by police
without giving him careful warnings; the State of Arizona says that he does
not.6 In each of these cases the United States Supreme Court, as the ulti-
mate decision-maker in our constitutional system, agreed with the individ-
ual and ruled against the state. In doing so the Court argued, explicity or
implicitly, along these lines: The Bill of Rights has placed certain restrictions
upon what a state may do with respect to its citizens; the precise lines of
these limitations are not always clear. True, the rights asserted by the indi-
vidual are not absolute, but in the context before us, and in similar cases, a
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
6. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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careful balancing of the interests of the individual and those of the state makes
it clear that the individual should prevail-that he has a "right"-a right
to counsel in all serious criminal cases (Gideon), a right not to be convicted
with illegally seized evidence (Mapp), a right not to be convicted with con-
fessions obtained without warnings which we hereby make precise (Miranda).
The proposition which I here offer for professional criticism and debate is
this: In law there are no merely individual rights. Every civil right is a
social right. The dichotomy of interest of individual and interest of society
(I need not say state) is an inheritance of Lockean and Rousseauian political
theory based on the fiction of the social contract. More properly we should
say that our courts and legislatures in declaring new rights make this deter-
mination: The accepted legal-political-social-moral ideas of our society put
so high a social value upon the claim which this individual plaintiff makes
here today, that we view his claim, on behalf of himself and others similarly
situated in our society, as deserving vindication in this context against the
(perhaps) also important social ideal advanced by his opponent. The indi-
vidual has argued for the high value our society has put upon his not being
forced to incriminate himself; the state has argued for the practical needs of
law enforcement in a society troubled by crime. The true focus is not "bal-
ancing of interests"--individual against society-it is in weighing society's
competing interests, or values, in a given context. That is my thesis. What
kind of support for it can be found in the cases? Not a great deal, if we limit
our inquiry to what courts have said-a few respectable blocks on which
to build, if we attend to what some courts have done.
I. Some Respectable Precedent
Perhaps the most graphic example of rights as social comes in constitutional
law in the sacred precincts of the first amendment, of all places. Without
stirring up the controversy about whether first amendment rights still have a
"preferred position,"'7 we note the strong protection given to individuals who
7. The "preferred position" doctrine, which is somewhat in eclipse, derived from
Justice Stone's celebrated footnote in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144 (1938). After using a "rational basis" test for upholding a federal statute excluding
filled milk from interstate commerce, Justice Stone inserted this note:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitu-
tionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition
of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are
deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. ...
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most
other types of legislation.
Id. at 152 n.4. The suggestion was taken up in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949);
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assert rights of speech, press and association. This protection is not keyed to
the intrinsic value of a particular utterance or protest or group; it rests ex-
pressly upon the high value placed by our political system in keeping open the
channels of change. The courts stress that the prospect of legal change de-
pends upon the continuing availability of avenues of effective stimulation of
new ideas, even ideas which are unpopular at the moment. It is here that
the notion arose that only a "clear and present danger" to the society over-
rides the social interest in maintaining free expression.8
Other instances in the constitutional field include the interpretation of the
fourth amendment search and seizure provision, and the use of the fifth
amendment's self-incrimination clause to reverse convictions based upon both
involuntary confessions and those confessions not surrounded by particular-
ized safeguards. These rights are vindicated although there may not be the
slightest question in anyone's mind that the individual did the crime alleged.
Society's interest is the determinant here. This was recognized by Mr. Justice
Stewart: "[t]he exclusionary rule . . . balances the desirability of deterring
objectionable police conduct against the undesirability of excluding relevant
and reliable evidence." '
Further accent upon the social character of the interest asserted by the
individual plaintiff in these cases comes from the limitations put by the Su-
preme Court upon the effective coverage of the new dimensions given by the
Mapp and Miranda cases. In Linkletter v. Walker,10 the plaintiff had been
convicted after Miss Mapp; yet the rule in her case was held to apply only to
cases tried subsequent to, or actively in the judicial process on, the date of
the Supreme Court's Mapp decision. In Johnson v. New Jersey," the appel-
lant (among "some 80" others) had filed the case in the Supreme Court be-
fore Miranda was decided. Yet only Miranda, and three appellants whose
cases were argued with Miranda, got the benefit of the Miranda rules.' 2 The
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 316
U.S. 584 (1942). See also Justice Frankfurter's criticism of "preferred position" in
Kovacs v. Cooper, supra at 90-97.
8. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919); see Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52
COLUM. L. REV. 313 (1952); Nathanson, The Communist Trial and the Clear-and-
Present-Danger Test, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1167 (1950).
9. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 44 n.2 (1967) (concurring) where the
possibility of "harmless error" was left open.
10. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
11. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
12. The most notorious example [of applying a new rule only to the case where
it arises] is Miranda v. Arizona . . . where, as I recall, some 80 cases were
presented raising the same question. We took four of them and held the
rest and then disposed of each of the four, applying the new procedural rule
retroactively. But as respects the rest of the pending cases we denied any
1969]
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outraged dissents of Justices Black and Douglas in Linkletter and Johnson
are unanswerable if a theory of individual rights is strictly honored and
equality of treatment is still held in esteem.
The doctrine of "standing" to sue, a doctrine which has had a special basis
in the federal courts because of the constitutional requirement that there be
a "case or controversy,"' has been rested upon the premise that an individual
claim that his "legal right" has been infringed. The Federal Communica-
tions Act gave a right to appeal an order of the FCC to the immediate appli-
cant whose claim was denied and to "any other person who is aggrieved or
whose interests are adversely affected" by a Commission decision granting an
application. 14 Sanders Brothers Radio Station intervened in an FCC proceed-
ing in opposition to an application by a newspaper in the city across the river
for a construction permit to build a broadcasting station. The permit was
granted and Sanders Brothers sought to appeal as a "person aggrieved." The
Supreme Court specifically found that Sanders Brothers had suffered no injury
to a traditionally recognized interest ("right"), yet it upheld its standing to
appeal as a "person aggrieved" within the intent of the statute: "Congress
had some purpose in enacting § 402(b) (2). It may have been of [the]
opinion that one likely to be financially injured by the issue of a license would
be the only person having a sufficient interest to bring to the attention of the
appellate court errors of law in the action of the Commission in granting the
license.' 5 The same Court that was not willing to recognize economic
injury to Sanders Brothers as a competitor as sufficient to give a statutory
right to appeal, found that they could sue as bearers of the social interest in
testing administrative irregularity. This point was made sharper two years
later in Scripps-Howard Radio where the Court said: "these private litigants
have standing only as representatives of the public interest."' 6
A further step in this type of analysis was taken in 1943 by Judge Jerome
Frank in the Associated Industries case.' 7 The plaintiffs, a coal consumers'
relief .... Yet it was sheer coincidence that those precise four were chosen.
Any other single case in the group or any other four would have been suffi-
cient for our purposes.
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 255 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
13. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1; Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (2), (6) (1964).
15. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940). Cf. Perkins
v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940): "Respondents, to have standing in court,
must show an injury or threat to a particular right of their own, as distinguished from
the public's interest in the administration of the law." Id. at 125 (Black, J.) citing
Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922); Stearns v. Wood, 236 U.S. 75, 78 (1915).
In Perkins, prospective government contractors (iron and steel producers) sued to en-join the Secretary of Labor from demanding minimum wages in government contracts.
16. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942).
17. Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.).
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trade association, attempted to appeal a decision under the "[a]ny person ag-
grieved" section of the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937.18 A recent Supreme
Court decision' had ruled that consumers had no standing to bring an action
to enjoin enforcement of the Secretary of the Interior's order. Frank dis-
tinguished Associated Industries from that case on the ground that this was a
statutory appeal action, and not an original injunction suit. He then faced
squarely the contention that the standing doctrine would still bar appeal.
Congress could not authorize suit in the absence of a justiciable controversy,
he conceded, but there was such a controversy here, even though the plain-
tiffs had suffered no detriment to a traditionally recognized legal interest.
Citing Sanders Brothers and Scripps-Howard, Frank's analysis broadened the
basis of those cases beyond their level of putative statutory interpretation.
Plaintiffs were acting, said Frank in a creative mood, as "private Attorney
Generals," vindicating the public interest:
[Congress] can constitutionally authorize one of its own officials,
such as the Attorney General, to bring a proceeding to prevent
another official from acting in violation of his statutory powers
. . . . Instead of designating the Attorney General, or some other
public officer, to bring such proceedings, Congress can constitution-
ally enact a statute conferring on any non-official person ...
authority to bring a suit to prevent action by an officer in violation
of his statutory powers.20
This is true, said Frank, "even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public
interest. Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney
Generals." 21
Similar concern by the law in vindicating social interests is seen in private
informers' suits2 2 and in suits under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act.23  Even the clearest instance of a suit for breach of contract rests
upon the social interest in having agreements enforced, and this is done
through permitting the aggrieved individual to bring legal action. Where
social policy is otherwise, as in wagering contracts, there is no legally cog-
nizable right.
In his celebrated Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium decision in 1934,24
Chief Justice Hughes underscored the constant interplay of interests in the tra-
18. Ch. 127, § 6(b), 50 Stat. 85.
19. Atlanta v. Ickes, 308 U.S. 517 (1939).
20. Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943).
21. Id.
22. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943), wherein the Supreme
Court upheld a judgment for a citizen-informer who himself had no interest whatever
in the controversy other than that given by statute-the so-called Federal Informers
Act, Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 6, 12 Stat. 698.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
24. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398.
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ditionally private field of mortgage contracts. A Minnesota statute permitted
local courts to extend the period of redemption from foreclosure sales "for
such additional time as the court may deem just and equitable." Mortgagors
cited the specific "obligation of contract" clause as well as the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Federal Constitution as rendering the act un-
constitutional. Replying to the "contract clause" argument, Chief Justice
Hughes said:
Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obliga-
tions between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes
of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the
legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment
presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which
contractual relations are worth while,-a government which retains
adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. 25
The opinion cited the developing history of "[t]his principle of harmonizing
the constitutional prohibition with the necessary residuum of state power."' 26
Grants of exclusive privileges in charters of private corporations could not be
implied against the state. Legislatures cannot "bargain away the public
health or the public morals."'2 7 A valid lottery authorized by express state
authority may be revoked without redress; similarly an authorized liquor
business or a nuisance specifically authorized by contract may be abated. "The
reservation of state power appropriate to such extraordinary conditions may
be deemed to be as much a part of all contracts, as is the reservation of state
power to protect the public interest in the other situations to which we have
referred [just above]." '28
The Chief Justice contested the notion that because the founders had no
such view when the Constitution was adopted, there could be no constitu-
tional development in this direction. Citing "a growing appreciation of pub-
lic needs and of the necessity of finding ground for a rational compromise
between individual rights and public welfare, '29 Hughes turned to the his-
torical argument:
It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended a
century ago, or to insist that what the provision of the Constitution
meant to the vision of that day it must mean to the vision of our
time. If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the
time of its adoption it means to-day, it is intended to say that the
great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the interpreta-
tion which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their
25. Id. at 435.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 436.
28. Id. at 439.
29. Id. at 442.
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time, would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own
refutation.80
He then cited Chief Justice Marshall's "memorable warning" made "to guard
against such a narrow [interpretation] . . . 'We must never forget that it is a
constitution we are expounding. . . a constitution intended to endure for ages
to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs.' "31
While Chief Justice Hughes, in the passage above, did use the "individual
rights and public welfare" terminology, he later made clear that he intended
that protection of "individual rights" was itself a public interest: "The [state]
legislation was addressed to a legitimate end, that is, the legislation was not
for the mere advantage of particular individuals but for the protection of a
basic interest of society."'82 The competing "individual rights" of the mort-
gagors and the mortgagees were resolved by the legislation and constitutional
interpretation, in the crucible of the "basic interest of society." In this
inescapable sense, we may argue, all legal rights are social rights. As
Justice Jackson said in the context of denials of hearings in immigration cases:
"Let it not be overlooked that due process of law is not for the sole benefit of
an accused. It is the best insurance for the Government itself against those
blunders which leave lasting stains on a system of justice but which are bound
to occur on ex parte consideration."88
II. The Inadequacy of "Individual Rights" Theory
All these instances, it may be suggested, do no more than stand for the
proposition that some rights which are vindicated by individuals are social
rights, and that some individual rights are qualified by needs of the whole
society. They do not, it may still be contended, establish that every legal
right is a social right; and Chief Justice Hughes' statement in the Minnesota
30. Id. at 442-43.
31. Id. at 443, citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415
(1819).
32. 290 U.S. at 445.
33. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1953)
(dissenting). See also United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,
551 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting):
Security is like liberty in that many are the crimes committed in its name. The
menace to the security of this country, be it great as it may, from this girl's
admission is as nothing compared to the menace to free institutions inherent in
procedures of this pattern. In the name of security the police state justifies
its arbitrary oppressions on evidence that is secret, because security might be
prejudiced if it were brought to light in hearings. The plea that evidence of
guilt must be secret is abhorrent to free men, because it provides a cloak for
the malevolent, the misinformed, the meddlesome, and the corrupt to play
the role of informer undetected and uncorrected.
19691
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Mortgage Moratorium case that we need not adhere to the precise understand-
ings of the framers would clearly cover a change in our legal theory and
terminology, but it does not justify the change proposed herein. Why the
effort now to change our traditional "individual rights" theory which, on the
whole, has stood us pretty well? What experiences of inadequacy of the
present "rights" theory justify considering a change? In answer to these
contentions it must be remembered that the basic criterion in evaluating a
legal theory is whether it most correctly explains what is going on, and gives
the greatest promise of achieving the basic social goals of the society. The
following instances are preliminary suggestions that the individual rights theory
has let us down rather badly in many areas of legal development.
"Rights" and "Privileges"
We begin by recalling the creaking state of the "right-privilege" doctrine.
This dichotomy was styled to distinguish instances in which a plaintiff had a
sufficient quantum of interest from those where he did not. The classic area
concerns the problem of granting, revocation and renewal of business licenses-
whether to conduct a special type of business at a given place, or whether to
exercise a profession or occupation (such as airline pilot or truck driver)
which requires a personal license. After adverse action by administrators,
hearings were at first denied on the distinction that what was involved was
not a (property) right, but a privilege which the state was free to deny or to
bestow. Some courts, without rejecting the privilege notion, made distinc-
tions in favor of applicants when good character was brought into question.34
Others distinguished between revocation (a protected interest) and mere re-
newal (privilege). 30 Others apparently had the grant of a hearing turn on
the dignity of the occupation: professional people, yes; dance halls, pool halls,
liquor shops, no.30  To still others it became apparent that whether it be
called "right," "privilege" or "valuable privilege," there were two distinct
elements of public interest involved: a need of immediate public protection
(e.g., an airplane pilot accused of blacking-out); and great injury to citizens
pursuing callings.37
34. Cf. Walker v. Clinton, 244 Iowa 1099, 59 N.W.2d 785 (1953) (beer license
revocation upheld-privilege); Perpente v. Moss, 293 N.Y. 325, 56 N.E.2d 726 (1944)(license to conduct employment agency; though statute did not require hearing, where
refusal was on ground of applicant's lack of good character, hearing was necessary).
35. See cases cited in Gilchrist v. Bierring, 234 Iowa 899, 14 N.W.2d 724 (1944),
where this odd distinction was rejected. On the other hand, Massachusetts, by stat-
ute, forbids revocation or failure to renew a license without an opportunity for a hear-
ing. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 13 (1966).
36. This classification is reported by W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 762 (4th ed. 1960). The cases cited in notes 34-37
are collected by these authors at pp. 751-69.
37. Compare Thornhill v. Kirkman, 62 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1953) (summary suspension
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As Gellhom and Byse point out, in no event should granting or denying a
hearing turn "on the ground that there is in the one case or another a mere
privilege or a vested right."'38  The determination in fact rests upon the judg-
ment as to the dominant social interest in the circumstances, and one of these
interests is that "due process" accompany denying men the pursuit of a calling.
Balancing of Interests
A second discomfort deriving from the "individual rights" terminology is met
in the clumsy "balancing of interests" test in constitutional law. A classic
example of the "balancing" technique is furnished by the Barenblatt case,3 9
in which the defendant resisted inquiries by the House Un-American Activities
Committee. Justice Harlan posed the question for the majority: "Once more
the Court is required to resolve the conflicting constitutional claims of con-
gressional power and of an individual's right to resist its exercise. '40  And he
answered it: "We conclude that the balance between the individual and
the governmental interests here at stake must be struck in favor of the
latter .... "41
Numerous criticisms have been advanced against the "balancing of in-
terests" test. It has been said that balancing is an "inversion of the old
theory that the first amendment has a preferred status, ' 42 that it leads to
assumed judicial arbitrariness, and that there is frequent uncertainty as to
just what is being balanced. 43 The "individual rights" theory lends itself to
posing the question in terms of embattled individual and provident state. Mr.
of driver's license for alleged recklessness upheld where statute provided for hearing
after suspension) and Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (Federal Home
Loan Bank Board regulations permitting appointment of conservator of private bank-
ing institution prior to hearing) with Wignall v. Fletcher, 303 N.Y. 435, 103 N.E.2d
728 (1952) and Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421 (1954) (revoca-
tion of cab drivers' licenses required hearings).
38. "It can be justified on the sole and urgent ground that the need of protecting
the public must here override the protections that are customarily thrown around an
individual who may be affected by administrative action." W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 764 (4th ed. 1960). These authors
suggest, in an urgent case, immediate suspension, then a hearing, and then revocation
or reinstatement.
39. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
40. Id. at 111.
41. Id. at 134.
42. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1444-45
(1962).
43. See United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967). The
Court specifically declined to apply the "balancing" technique in a federal first amend-
ment context in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967) (Warren, C.J.).
Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, did apply the "balancing" test.
See also Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Mendelson,
51 CALIF. L. REV. 729 (1963).
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Justice Black, an opponent of balancing, in his Barenblatt dissent formulated
what I conceive to be the true interests in conflict-each of them social:
[The Court] balances the right of the Government to preserve it-
self, against [the defendant's] right to refrain from revealing Com-
munist affiliations. Such a balance, however, . . . completely
leaves out the real interest in Barenblatt's silence, the interest of the
people as a whole in being able to join organizations, advocate
causes and make political "mistakes" without later being subjected
to governmental penalties for having dared to think for them-
selves. . . . It is these interests of society, rather than Barenblatt's
own right to silence, which I think the Court should put on the
balance against the demands of the Government, if any balancing
process is to be tolerated. 44
A frank recognition that it is competing social interests which are at issue
will not resolve the tensions between these interests; this is still matter for
decision. But correctly posing the question would forestall such formulas of
decision as: "[G]overnmental interest in self-preservation is sufficiently
compelling to subordinate the interest in associational privacy of persons
. . ."45 and "to reconcile the competing claims of government and individual
and to determine the propriety of the Committee's demands . . . it is an
essential prerequisite . . . that the State convincingly show a substantial
relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and com-
pelling state interest. '46  It would also go far to meet the continuing con-
tention of Mr. Justice Black (in opposition to balancing) that first amend-
ment rights are themselves absolutes.
Retroactivity of Constitutional Decisions
We have already referred to the Supeme Court's last major jurisprudential
effort-its justification of a prospective constitutional decision in Linkletter
44. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 144 (1959). See also United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) wherein Chief Justice Warren formulated the
interests in conflict, both of which are conceived as social:
[T]he phrase "war power" cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation to
support any exercise of Congressional power which can be brought within its
ambit. . . . [T]his concept of "national defense" cannot be deemed an end
in itself, justifying any exercise of legislative power designed to promote such
a goal. Implicit in the term "national defense" is the notion of defending those
values and ideals which set this nation apart. For almost two centuries, our
country has taken singular pride in the democratic ideals enshrined in its
Constitution, and the most cherished of those ideals have found expression in
the First Amendment. It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national
defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties--the
freedom of association-which makes the defense of the nation worthwhile.
Id. at 263-64.
45. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 81 (1959).
46. Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963).
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v. Walker47 and its progeny.4 The erratic development of the Linkletter
doctrine has lent credence to suspicion of an arbitrariness of constitutional
decision. Because this suspicion seems at least partly rooted in the "indi-
vidual rights" theory, it is worth examining the prospectivity problem in some
detail.
In 1965, in two cases in the highly controversial field where state police
law enforcement clashes with asserted rights of the accused under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Court launched a new doc-
trine asserting its power to restrict the application of whatever novel legal
rule is announced in case X to cases tried subsequent to the date when X was
decided. The Court's analysis as first unfolded in Linkletter v. Walker came
down to this: Since judges really "make" law and do not merely "find" it, a
judicial rule may be given merely prospective effect whenever, and to the
extent that, in the Court's view such a course is desirable. The Supreme
Court then proposed certain criteria of desirability for "mere prospectivity" in
the police law enforcement-civil rights field in Linkletter and in the Miranda
series of cases which followed in 1966. 49
Without much concern with its historical origins, American courts from the
beginning adopted the English practice of giving "retroactive effect" to new
judicial decisions. But unlike the English judges, many American courts
assumed a broad freedom in reversing their precedents, even interpretations
they had previously given to legislative enactments. In the period between
the two Wars in this century some state courts became persuaded that the
practical retroactivity of decision-making in cases reversing precedent was
unfair to those litigants who had depended on the earlier rule which the
court felt needed judicial correction. And when the "correction" of decisional
law involved a change in interpretation of a criminal statute to the disad-
47. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
48. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (the new rule is to apply,
beyond the winning petitioner, only to "future cases in which the proscribed official
conduct has not yet occurred") citing Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968) (the new
rule is to be applied only to "those cases in which the tainted evidence has not yet
been introduced at trial .... "); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968); Stovall
v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). The descriptions quoted herein are from Mr.
Justice Harlan's sharp criticism of the "incompatible rules and inconsistent principles"
that have "characterized our efforts to apply the basic Linkletter principle." Desist v.
United States, supra at 257-58. See also Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969),
where Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), was interpreted as permitting a
state to omit the Miranda warnings from "post-Miranda retrials of cases originally
tried prior to that decision." 395 U.S. at 213-14.
49. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The criteria as to whether a new
rule will be given merely prospective effect were summarized in Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719 (1966): "We must look to the purpose of our new standards [rule] . . .
the reliance which may have been placed upon prior decisions on the subject, and the
effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application .... ." Id. at 727.
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vantage of a defendant some courts even intimated that the customary "retro-
active effect" of judicial decision went against the spirit, at least, of a cherished
canon of penal law, "Nulla poena sine lege."
Some of these state courts, when confronted with an unsatisfactory rule of
common law or of statutory interpretation, devised a new technique: they
would announce a change in the governing rule of law with respect to the
future, but apply the "old" rule to litigation before them. The underlying
theory was that the judge (or court) would in the instant case be applying the
old rule, and merely announcing his intention to apply another rule in similar
cases in the future. 50
In 1932, the United States Supreme Court had occasion to reject a constitu-
tional challenge to a state court's use of the prospective theory. At least, Mr.
Justice Cardozo wrote for the Court in Sunburst,5 there is nothing found in
the "due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment which prevents a state
court from giving merely prospective effect to its decision, that is, applying the
old rule to an instant case, while announcing a new rule of decision for the
future. As to this the Constitution is silent. 2 From Cardozo's discussion of
the novel device it is clear that he envisaged its use chiefly in cases where re-
liance by a party on the old rule would make it unjust to depart from it in a
given case. He did not view prospective overruling as a substitute for the
traditional retrospective technique in cases where there was no marked
departure from common expectations. Most clearly, the area marked out for
"prospective" decision was that of a square reversal of precedent, although
it was not to be rigidly confined to this situation.
Despite the impetus given it by Sunburst the new technique of "prospective"
judicial decision-making did not enjoy wide vogue. One constitutional ob-
stacle had been hurdled in Sunburst, but there remained another practical
obstacle: the concern of courts that broad use of the technique of merely
prospective change in a decisional rule would deprive litigants of the incentive
to press appeals in cases where victory required judicial change of existing
50. Resort was first made to the new notion of "prospective overruling" in two
chief categories of cases: (1) cases in which the court sought to reverse its earlier
interpretation of a criminal statute, e.g., State v. Longino, 109 Miss. 125, 67 So. 902
(1915); State v. Simanton, 100 Mont. 292, 49 P.2d 981 (1935); State v. Jones, 44
N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940); State v. Bell, 136 N.C. 674, 49 S.E. 163 (1904);
and (2) cases in which courts were intent on protecting officials who had purported to
act under state statutes which the court now determined to be unconstitutional. See
Note, Prospective Operation of Decisions Holding Statutes Unconstitutional or Over-
ruling Prior Decisions, 60 HARV. L. REV. 437, 443-44 (1947). The device was rarely
resorted to in civil litigation; particularly rare was prospective overruling of decisional
rules of common law. However, an exception is the Kentucky case, Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Bryant, 296 Ky. 815, 177 S.W.2d 588 (1943).
51. Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358.
52. "We think the federal constitution has no voice upon the subject." Id. at 364.
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decisional law. Use of the "prospective" technique did not extend to the fed-
eral courts. As late as 1965 the Supreme Court itself had expressed no
favorable view with respect to its use beyond the Sunburst holding that there
was no barrier in the Constitution that would prevent a state court from
using the "prospective" device. 53
There was, furthermore, a clear negative indication from the Supreme
Court that seemed to bar the use of prospective decision-making with respect
to newly pronounced constitutional rules. Two cases announcing "new" con-
stitutional rights will illuminate this point. In Griffin v. Illinois5 4 the Su-
preme Court decided for the first time that "due process" and "equal pro-
tection of the laws" required that a state furnish an indigent appellant with a
transcript of the record of the case in the lower court as an essential ingredient
of his right to appeal. Griffin received the accustomed retroactive benefit of
the new rule. Subsequently, one Eskridge, a second wave appellant55 who
had been convicted 20 years earlier in the State of Washington, claimed the
benefit of the 1956 Griffin pronouncement. The Court accepted his con-
tention that the Court in 1956 had merely given expression to a right that was
inherent in the constitutional provisions when they had been originally adopted
in 1868, and thus spoke from that time.56
From 1942 to 1963 the Court repeatedly maintained that the United States
Constitution did not entail that defendants be given counsel in noncapital
state criminal cases. The Court would, however, in this period set aside state
convictions in any case in which the absence of counsel deprived the defend-
ant, in the Court's opinion, of a "fair trial. ' 57 In the celebrated Gideon case
53. One arguable exception is England v. Louisiana Bd. of Med. Examiners, 375
U.S. 411 (1964), but this case involved a procedural issue.
54. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
55. We may discuss "prospectivity" of judicial decision as a two-wave affair. The
first wave is the case in which the new constitutional rule is first adopted. The new
rule is retroactively applied to the victorious litigant. In the second wave, i.e.,
collateral attack, are the closed cases. The contest here is whether one convicted
earlier under a rule or practice now deemed constitutionally objectionable must be
given the benefit of the "new" rule when he claims it in a habeas corpus proceeding.
The consideration of res judicata, of course, ordinarily prevents litigants from re-
opening civil litigation once put to rest. This disability does not, however, apply to
those criminal cases in which litigants invoke the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus
which becomes the ordinary vehicle of the second wave.
56. Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
57. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). The Constitution provides that "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932), the Supreme Court held that this provision was binding against the states
by virtue of the "due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment. Powell was a
capital case. Betts held that the Powell rule did not apply in noncapital cases; in such
cases, reversal of conviction would depend on the Court's deciding that the denial of
counsel had deprived the defendant of a "fair trial." 316 U.S. at 463-64. See gen-
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in 1963 the Court abandoned the "fair trial" rule for an absolute constitu-
tional guarantee of counsel.55  Gideon, of course, went free. The following
year one Doughty, who had been convicted without counsel years before by
the State of Louisiana, demanded his release, citing the Gideon rule. The
Supreme Court agreed with his contention, holding, in effect, that Gideon
expressed the "true" constitutional rule. The Court's 20-year rule to the con-
trary was merely an aberration that it had corrected in Gideon. Those con-
victed under the prior (Betts) rule could now seek relief by habeas corpus
proceedings in which the "true" (i.e., Gideon) rule would be given effect. 59
Thus, in the constitutional area at least, it appeared that the Supreme
Court conceived itself as continually "declaring" existing law and not
"making" new law. Its analysis in these cases, though not clearly articulated,
seemed to assume that every litigant (not barred by res judicata) might be
entitled to have applied to himself as a "right" the "correct" view of the
Constitution, i.e., that view expressed by the most recent declaration of the
Court "better informed."
In Mapp v. Ohio, 0 the Supreme Court frankly reversed a constitutional
rule of 14 years standing. The successful first wave appellant, Miss Dolree
Mapp, was discharged from custody on the strength of her appellate victory.
As in Griffin and Gideon the new rule directly overruled the Court's law
on the point as it stood on the date of her trial and conviction. After Eskridge
and Doughty had successfully mounted their release on the doctrines of
Griffin and Gideon, respectively, another second wave appellant sought his
release on the strength of the new Mapp rule. But this second wave appel-
lant was turned down in Linkletter v. Walker,61 as a new formulation of the
merely prospective overruling doctrine was adopted for the first time by the
Court. Comparable failures of second wave appellants in Tehan,62 and in
Johnson v. New Jersey,6 3 in 1966, cemented the Court's commitment to an
entirely unique doctrine that asserts general power in the Court to deny sec-
ond wave retroactivity.6 4
erally Broderick, Evolving Due Process and the French Institutionalists: Reflections
on the Right to Counsel and the Adamson Dissent, 13 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 95 (1964).
58. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335.
59. Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964) (per curiam). See also Pickel-
simer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963) (per curiam); United States ex rel. Durocher
v. La Vallee, 330 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 998 (1964).
60. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
61. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
62. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
63. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
64. The subsequent history of the Linkletter doctrine has basically adhered to the
Johnson formula. See notes 49-50 supra for principal cases and variations. In Stovall
v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), a new constitutional doctrine was limited to future
cases in which the proscribed official conduct had not taken place by the date of the
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It is difficult to answer on any concept of individual justice the argument of
Justices Black and Douglas in their dissenting opinions in Linkletter5 (re-
newed, by reference, in Johnson"6 ). They urged that the "like treatment in
like cases" that is widely accepted as the most central notion of individual
justice was denied to Linkletter. He had committed his offense and been
tried before Miss Mapp and convicted upon the very same type of objection-
able evidence. Yet she went free, and Linkletter remains in jail. Similar
considerations arise as to those who had been convicted after subjection to
"objectionable interrogations" like Miranda's between the date of his trial and
his victory in the Supreme Court. The Miranda rules were held (in Johnson)
to be unavailable to such others.
One basic cause for discontent with the Linkletter doctrine is removed,
once we approach constitutional litigation from the standpoint of "social right."
We are spared the contentions of "unfairness" on each extreme. The state
will no longer be able to say to the Court: "We took you at your word on the
ground rules for administration of justice. You have changed the rules in the
middle of the game. We are at least entitled to have this rule made purely
prospective." The individual petitioners who were tried and convicted on the
basis of procedures once accepted but now deemed in violation of "due proc-
ess" will no longer be able to claim "unequal" treatment if the new rule is not
applied to them. A clear-cut basic proposition can then be frankly avowed:
New constitutional rules, like new legislation, speak only to the future-ex-
decision fixing the new rule. The Court summarized its prevailing standards for
determining retroactivity vel non: "The criteria guiding resolution of the question
implicate (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the
reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on
the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." Id.
at 297. In only three cases subsequent to Johnson does the Court appear to have made
a new "right" retroactive. These were, first, Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968) in
which Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) was applied retroactively. Bruton
involved a refinement on the application of the sixth amendment right to confrontation
to the states as enunciated in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Second, Berger v.
California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969) which concerned Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968),
another right to confrontation case. Third, McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968),
which held retroactive Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), involving the right to
counsel at sentencing.
65. 381 U.S. at 640.
66. 384 U.S. at 736. Justice Harlan has joined Justices Black and Douglas in
dissatisfaction with the doctrine. In Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969),
Justice Harlan strongly dissented from the "merely prospective" application of the anti-
eavesdropping rule of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), citing "so many
incompatible rules and inconsistent principles" that Linkletter-Johnson had spawned.
394 U.S. at 258. When Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969), interpreted Johnson
to bar the need for Miranda standards at post-Miranda retrials of cases tried before
that decision, Harlan again dissented and protested (though he had dissented in
Miranda): "[T]he time has come for us to take a fresh look at the whole problem of
retroactivity." Id. at 224.
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cept for the present litigant. 7 The only reason for granting the benefit of the
new rule to the litigant in whose case it is announced is the social interest of
fostering development of the law in light of changing times. Constitutional
rules elaborating the general terms of the Constitution are in practice the work
of courts (the amendment procedures have rarely been used). Courts only
act in response to concrete cases brought before them for decision. These
cases will not be brought unless victorious litigants may profit by the new
decision their litigation has created. Constitutional decisions are new evalua-
tions of the basic document in light of new social needs. In such decisions the
social interests in (1) stimulating litigants to press for new solutions, and (2)
protecting reliance on previously announced rules, such as in the administra-
tion of criminal justice, require vindication. What the Court in fact did in
Linkletter was to satisfy these two interests. It was prevented by the "indi-
vidual right" analysis from giving an adequate rational support to this action.
A further vice of the new prospectivity from Linkletter to Desist is that it
purports to give objective grounds for each new declaration of mere pros-
pectivity. The premise is that otherwise there may be an "individual right"
which is unjustifiably being denied. The true distinction should be between
cases which are adumbrations of earlier decisions (the latest decision being
a specification of an earlier, more general one), and cases which are clear
departures from prior law.68 The clearest departure is the square overthrow
of a prior doctrine, as in Mapp, despite some prior indications of "stormy
weather." It seems fair to say, as the Court there did, that Miranda was not
inevitable from Escobedo69 (though the point is arguable). This is not to say
that the palm of victory need always be limited to the winning litigant in the
case in which the new rule is made. Where other petitioners have already
reached the Supreme Court it is the sheerest arbitrariness, on any theory of
rights, for one to be favored and others rebuffed. The Johnson case, for rea-
sons brought into new prominence by the proposed "social right" analysis,
must surely rank with the great injustices of recent Court history. 70 The social
interest in equal treatment surely goes this far, and the social interest in the
administration of justice would have been but slightly disadvantaged, if all
the litigants then within, if not before, the Supreme Court had been adjudged
on Miranda terms. The broad discretion given the Court in accepting
cases for hearing and in sorting out its calendar must not be exploited to justify
67. See qualification in text below to include others whose appeal is presently before
the Court.
68. The "mere adumbrations" would call for traditional "retroactive decision," a
misnomer here for the Court would simply be following implicit precedent. The
"clear departures" would be merely prospective, as a rule, to be departed from in favor
of defendant only when justice clearly called for an exception.
69. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
70. Cf. Mr. Justice Douglas' exposure of the ambience of Johnson, supra note 12.
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arbitrary selectivity if confidence in the constitutional process is to remain.
The "social right" formulation leaves intact what seems realistic in the Link-
letter doctrine, its repudiation of the fiction of required retroactivity of con-
stitutional decision, and relieves it of the arbitrariness of its own, and sub-
sequent, formulations. By this I mean the need to pronounce anew with each
new constitutional rule whether or not it is to be retroactively applied.
III. Application of "Social Rights" Terminology
The preceding exposition is suggested as symbolic of the inadequacy of a
theory of legal rights posed in terms of a dichotomy of individual and state,
or society. The individual "right of property" does not loom so high in our
social evaluations today as it did at the time of John Locke and our con-
stitutional forebears. There is no reason we should be any more content with
the outdated conceptual terminology that presupposed his individualistic,
property-conscious political theory. The new rights we hear contended for
today are sometimes phrased in the old property terminology in which
Anglo-American law has been written for two centuries; but in general they
are directed towards new methods of fulfilling human existence in society.
Is it not then timely to shift away from a terminology of "individual rights?"
We can best examine this question in the light of three asserted "rights"
which are either making, or are on the verge of making, successful bids for
recognition. Does the "social right" concept clarify or obscure what is hap-
pening here?
Right to Welfare
In a perceptive series of studies Professor Charles Reich of Yale Law School 7'
has given visibility and, many believe, persuasiveness to the notion that in a
modem industrial society welfare should no longer be considered a matter of
charity, or a privilege to be bestowed or taken away at will. The dignity of
human personality, deformed by the handout posture, he urges, demands
that society recognize both legislatively and administratively that these are
"rights" of those who fall within the class of proper relief recipients. The
resistance which such a doctrine has met could have been anticipated. It is
rooted in the inherited concept of "individual rights." Many citizens who are
working rebel at the notion that others may claim money for nonworking as a
"right."
When we turn to the concept of a legal "right to welfare" as a "social right"
the posture changes. It is no longer merely asserted that this disadvantaged
71. Reich, Withdrawal of Public Welfare: The Right to a Prior Hearing, 76 YALE
L.J. 1234 (1967); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal
Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964);
Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347
(1963).
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individual by virtue of being a human person has a right for society to make
his way for him. This point may be true, but it is difficult to prove with
empirical evidence, and the resistance to it as dogma is empirically strong.
The new contention is this: The very force of social disruption and change
has created a situation where large numbers of people are de facto not sup-
porting themselves; there is no evidence that a mere will to work would
change their situation on present terms. It is an interest of a society which
professes concern for equal opportunity and human dignity not only to feed its
hungry, but to provide conditions which are best calculated to improve the
human conditions of its citizens. Human history has given a strong indication
that mere charity relief will not achieve this goal. And so the society should
take this new step of sparing the people who are thus disadvantaged the con-
tinued humiliation and hopelessness of contingent existence. This it may do,
so the argument would go, by recognizing in these people a "right to welfare"
under specified conditions. It is to the advantage of all, and not merely of the
recipients, that this be done. This argument would not persuade all, but is it
not a more persuasive approach to what is presently being proposed under
the rubric of a "right to welfare?"
Right to Treatment
The context of an asserted "right to treatment," in the sense discussed here,
is that of mental health. It has been asserted that persons who are involun-
tarily put in mental hospitals have a constitutional right to receive adequate
treatment, or be returned to social freedom.72  In the District of Columbia
the prevailing legislation on the rights of the mentally ill gives statutory recog-
nition to a "right to treatment. ' 73 This "right to treatment" has been given
some judicial implementation by the Circuit Court of Appeals in the District of
Columbia, 74 but its precise limits are hardly clear. What kind of treatment
will suffice to justify the retention of involuntary patients in a mental hos-
pital?
The District statute provides for retention of patients who are "dangerous
to themselves or others." 75 What happens when a patient who is receiving no
meaningful treatment is considered by his doctors, and the reviewing courts,
as still "dangerous." In this context a court might hold that the "right to
treatment" is paramount, and that those dangerous people with nontreatable
mental ills are not subject to compulsory hospitalization under present law.
72. See Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
73. D.C. CODE § 24-301 (1967).
74. See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (1966).
75. D.C. CODE § 24-301(e) (1967).
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To retain them is a form of subsumed preventive detention.76 Or a court
might hold that the "dangerousness" provision overrides the individual's right
to treatment.77 Would the same analysis govern in a situation where a patient
was treatable, but the hospital was not furnishing him any treatment? Should
his "individual right" now be considered weightier, as compared with "so-
ciety's" interest in keeping him confined?
If this problem is viewed in the context of "social right" it would not auto-
matically be resolved, but analysis would be more feasible. When a legis-
lature gives the "right to treatment" to an involuntary patient, it is making the
social judgment that our society puts so high a premium upon individual
liberty that if a person is hospitalized, as distinct from being simply detained
custodially, he should receive treatment or be released. The concept of
"dangerousness" here can be understood not as the "society" side of the scales
as distinguished from the individual side of "right to liberty," but rather as
one of two competing social values. One of them, liberty, is easily measured.
Either the individual is free, or he is confined. On the other hand, "dan-
gerousness" is not subject to an equally ready evaluation-it is founded on an
element of prediction. How reliable are the present criteria of prediction? If
they are not notably high are we not faced with the phenomenon of pre-
ventive detention? And whether or not preventive detention may be con-
stitutionally possible (another point more easily analyzed in "social right"
terms), is it not a more reasonable interpretation of a statute providing ex-
pressly for a "right to treatment" with the right hand, to assume that it did
not intend "preventive detention" with the left, in the absence of clear lan-
guage to that effect. 78
In any event it becomes clear in the analysis of a "right to treatment" as a
social right, that more complications exist than a simplistic view of an indi-
vidual's right to be treated or be released would assume. The complica-
tions not only give ample warning of the need for legislative refinements, but
give pause to those who would consider a "right to treatment" as of constitu-
tional dimensions in the present state of the psychiatric art.
Right of Prisoners to Rehabilitation
Recently attention in legal circles has turned to a discussion of rights of con-
victed prisoners. A generation ago the question would have been met with
76. See Cross v. Harris, No. 22,420 (D.C. Cir., April 16, 1969); Millard v. Harris,
406 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
77. See Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Cross, supra note 76, among
his last on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
78. See Soloman, Roundtable on Criminal Law, 20 J. LGAL ED. 426, 441-42
(1968) (remarks of A. Dershowitz).
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the answer that prisoners have forfeited their civil rights on conviction, loss
of citizenship for felons, loss of voting rights, etc. Today we are less sure.
We now know that the Constitution affords them some protections in theory.
They have a right to consult counsel, to have reasonable communication by
mail, not to be denied religious services of their choice, to have the help of
their fellow convicts in preparing writs of habeas corpus. 79 New York has
held that they have a constitutional right to a hearing and counsel when an
issue of fact is raised by their petition for habeas corpus;80 a "right" less cer-
tain in other jurisdictions, in practice. Issues that are gaining visibility con-
cern the existence and dimensions of prisoners' rights with respect to mail,
visitors, good time credit when transferred to mental hospitals during their
sentence, treatment while in mental hospitals, and some others. One of these
others which draws pained yawns in traditional circles is the suggestion that
they may also have a "right to rehabilitation."
If put in terms of "individual right" or of "balancing of interests" this new
claim does have an odd ring, perhaps. But can it be brushed aside with
equal assurance when put in terms of vindicating a "social right?" The
posture then becomes this: There is a grave social interest that steps be
taken in our penal system to prevent a continuance of the obvious fact that
prisons are a breeding place for crime; there is a crucial need from the stand-
point of the society to provide that in the course of incarceration (penalty) the
convicts be turned away from and not towards recidivism. When society is
convinced that this is a necessary step, it may take corrective measures
through recognizing in the convicts a "right to rehabilitation." This would
allow the vindication of the "social right" or need by letting prisoners sue
claiming a "right." This might be done in either of two ways-by letting
them secure release or transfer from a prison in which there was no provision
for rehabilitation ("treatment") or it might be done by allowing ex-convicts
to sue public officials or governments for damages where this rehabilitation
facility has not been provided. (This last recourse might also be had with
respect to hospital detention where no "treatment" is made available.) This
right might be recognized initially by the legislative process"' or it might be
done by judicial interpretation. The former may be preferable in view of
the novelty of the "right;" but the latter need not be excluded. 2
The chief point made in this section is not that there should or should not
be a right to welfare, right to treatment, or right to rehabilitation. It is to
79. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
80. People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 217 N.E.2d 636, 270 N.Y.S.2d
573 (1966).
81. Cf. D.C. CODE § 24-301 (1967).
82. Cf. Reich articles, supra note 71.
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indicate that what we have before us in all these instances (and others) is
not a balancing of interests of the individual versus society, but a regard for
two concerns, each of which is social. One set of social interests is pressed
by an individual asserting a new claim; the second set is defended by the
person of the institution resisting it. In this tension of social interests the
court, or the legislature,83 makes a judgment for or against. If the judgment
is "for" we have recognition of a new social right. In the context of our pre-
vious discussion the set of social interests advanced by the individuals would
be the social interest in fostering the human dignity of welfare unfortunates and
encouraging their assumption of full roles in society; the social interest in not
depriving mental patients of liberty where treatment is not given or avail-
able; and the social interest in so arranging our processes of institutional
correction that society will not be preyed on by "crime schools" conducted at
public expense. The social interests argued against acceptance of these po-
sitions would be, respectively, the social interest against encouraging malin-
gering and allocating funds for nonproductive persons; the social interest
against risking reintroduction into society of mentally ill persons who would
be dangerous to themselves or others; and the social interest against encour-
aging crime by "coddling criminals." We saw earlier the legal recognition of
social interests in testing the validity of activities of governmental agencies,
in having free discussion of public issues, and in encouraging pressing for
change of constitutional rules. In each of these cases the device of recognition
of a "right" in an individual is not an upgrading of his individual interest as
against the rest of society, but is simply a recognition that letting him sue on
behalf of society to vindicate a "right" is the most effective way of seeing
that a social interest is not just simply professed, but actively enforced.
Conclusion
It is not the design of this paper to elaborate theories on how new rights come
into existence. The genesis of rights, as Rudolf von Ihering8 4 and Maurice
Hauriou s5 point out, does underscore the "battle for the right" (von Ihering)
or the "risk for the right" (Hauriou) by a procession of individuals and
groups. 86 There is no discordance between their views and the contention
proposed here. The moral right after battle and risk endured for its sake
83. Before the legislature, the new claim could of course be pressed by an individual,
a private group, or by a governmental official or department. In the court context, it
would usually be advanced by individual litigants, although through such measures as
amicus curiae briefs it might be supported by these others as well.
84. See R. VON IHERING, DER KAMPF UM'S RECHT (2d ed. 1872) passim.
85. See M. HAURIOU, PRINCIPES DE DROIT PUBLIC 451-503 (2d ed. 1916) translated
in THE FRENCH INSTITUTIONALISTS 78-91 (Broderick ed., Welling transl. 1970).
86. A recent example is the decade of "battles" and "risks" which preceded enact-
ment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
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receives social recognition; it is adopted by the society, through its official
spokesmen, as its own. In this sense every legal right is a social right.
The theory of social right is most advantageously conceived in the context
of a constitutional system, in which the most fundamental ideas of the or-
ganized society are broadly etched out. The American constitutional and
legal development has been in the direction of a fuller consciousness and safe-
guard of the high social value of individual freedom and fulfillment. This
is not a development which can be advantageously conceived as a series of
grudging concessions by the state, or society, to the individual. The basic
idea of American political and legal development has been that the purpose
of organized government is to supply an environment for the fulfillment of its
citizens as persons. While never achieved fully in practice, the idea has never
been repudiated and inches forward toward greater realization. Through
stages of limited government and positive government, the idea has remained
in the foreground.
In our political and legal context it seems that recognition of all legal rights
as social rights would shed greater clarity upon the role of law in our institu-
tional system. Rights are not to be viewed as the products of banging on
tables87 nor as mystical genii to be plucked from a bottle by a verifiable natural
law, or by an all-knowing Court. They derive from social morality and ac-
cepted political ideals verified in constitutional development. They are tested
in the crucible of public morality, of social science, and of political and legal
prudence as to their likely effects. Reliable data as to psychological effects of
welfare as charity, as to availability of effective treatment of mental patients
and alcoholics,8 8 and as to stimulation of crime in merely custodial prisons,
are perhaps more relevant to the questions of new rights of welfare, treatment
and rehabilitation, than well-meaning over-optimism by legislatures or the
courts. In the absence of such studies legislatures may hesitate, but courts
must decide cases that come before them. In such instances courts may
sometimes find in their role a felt need to give impetus to human dignity and
freedom, as the paramount idea of the society. But consciousness that legis-
latures, too, have a responsibility for advancing these social values may pro-
mote more humility by constitutional courts in not second-guessing such leg-
islatures, save where they have grossly misread given socio-constitutional
values.
The analysis suggested here 9 is designed not to downgrade "fundamental
87. See A. Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 274 (1959): "to invoke justice is the same
thing as banging on the table."
88. Cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
89. The analysis proposed here is anything but new. In today's jurisprudential
categories it is most closely approached by the sociological jurists. Jurisprudence buffs
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freedoms," but to provoke a more realistic, and therefore better, understand-
ing of these freedoms and of the human dignity that they presuppose and
foster. Some may contend the effect of this analysis would be otherwise.
Fiat lux!
will detect resonances from Eugen Ehrlich, Rudolf von Ihering, Heck's interessen-
jurisprudenz, Frangois Geny, L6on Duguit, the French Institutionalists, and some
strains of Benjamin Cardozo, Roscoe Pound and Karl Llewellyn. For general orienta-
tion of these jurists, see W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY chs. 17, 18, 23-25 (4th ed. 1960).
But the key that unlocks the door, I believe, is contained in the almost offhand comment
of John Chipman Gray, "According to an old saying, everybody is born either a
nominalist or a realist." J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw 52 (1909).
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